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Abstract
This paper tests for income-related reporting heterogeneity in self-
assessed health (SAH). It also constructs a synthetic measure of clinical
health to decompose the effect of income on SAH into an effect on clin-
ical health (which is called a health production effect) and a reporting
heterogeneity effect. We Þnd health production effects essentially for the
low-income individuals, and reporting heterogeneity for the choice be-
tween the medium labels i.e. fair vs. good and for the high-income
individuals. As such, SAH should be used cautiously for the assessment
of income-related health inequalities in France. It is however possible
to minimize the reporting heterogeneity bias by dichotomizing the SAH
variable into a poor health / other health statuses distinction.
1 Introduction
Inequalities in terms of health outcomes, payment and access have been the sub-
ject of a lively literature in Economics (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000). The
calculation of health outcome inequality requires a good measure of individuals
state of health. This paper assumes that the key variable of interest for the de-
sign of public policies is clinical health1 Suppose now that Health Authorities
need a tool for monitoring income-related health inequalities. Such a tool should
enjoy the following properties: on the one hand the measure of clinical health
should be reliable, on the other hand the data should be collected at a low cost.
The latter is especially important for Health Authorities that operate at a local
level, because they may not have a lot of resources to devote to the follow-up
of health inequalities. In this perspective, self-assessed health measures, which
∗We would like to thank Andrew Clark, Andrew Jones, Hendrik Juerges, Teresa Bago dUvo
and seminar participants at the Workshop on measurement issues in subjective data (DIW
Berlin), at 5th World Congress of the iHEA, 14th European Workshop on Econometrics and
Health Economics (Dublin). Corresponding author: Carine Milcent, Paris-Joudan Sciences
Economiques, 48, Boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris. milcent@pse.ens.fr
1By clinical health, we mean health as it is deÞned by health institutions.
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are subjective measures of health, may be interesting. However, it has become
apparent in recent years that their reliability is questionable, because different
sociodemographic groups tend to perceive their health differently even when
their clinical health is the same. The term reporting heterogeneity is often
used to qualify this phenomenon, as in Shmueli (2003), but this heterogeneity
may be considered as a bias in the sense that subjective health is a biased mea-
sure of clinical health.2 The presence of reporting heterogeneity.in self-assessed
health in France is the key concern of this methodological paper. More speciÞ-
cally, we ask whether there is income-related reporting heterogeneity, since this
point is crucial for the measurement of health inequalities.
We suppose that clinical health is a random variable fHi (i is an index for the
individual), and consider a reporting device T (.), such that the level of health
reported for the agent, Hi, may be written as:
Hi = T [ eHi;Qi] (1)
where T (.) is a monotone transformation of eHi, for a given set Qi of individual-
and method-speciÞc factors, observable or unobservable, affecting reporting at
the time of the survey. When the reporting device T (.) is designed so as to
be independent of individual characteristics, one can claim to have an objec-
tive measure of clinical health. An important beneÞt of objective health mea-
sure is their inter-personal comparability: for two individuals i and j we have
Hi > Hj =⇒ eHi > eHj . However, there are a number of costs associated to
the use of any objective health measure. First, there are expensive to collect,
since the construction of a synthetic measure requires that a number of health
conditions be observed. Data collection can be based either on a costly device
of medical check-ups, which may induce a strong selection bias, or on the infor-
mation that the agent has available. In the latter case, since information results
from the individuals choice to collect information (via preventative health con-
sultations for example), the evaluation of health capital is potentially polluted
by individual preferences. Second, any synthetic health measure requires the
weighting of diverse medical criteria, and thus incorporates the individual pref-
erences of a sub-sample of the population (Gerdtham et al., 1999, Dolan, 2000).
However, as Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2000) note, what is important is not
that such a synthetic health measure include preference factors, but rather that
it should be as independent as possible of vested interests.
Measuring subjective health is much more cheaper. One widespread measure
of subjective health is obtained by asking individuals to evaluate their health
on an ordinal scale. This self-assessed health measure is easy to collect and is
strongly correlated with a number of measures of morbidity and mortality (see
2Other articles evoke state-dependent reporting bias (Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995),
and scale of reference bias (Groot, 2000). The epidemiological literature uses the more
technical term of response category cut-point shift (Sadana et al., 2000 and Murray et al.,
2001; also used by Lindeboom and van Doorslaer, 2004).
2
Idler and Benyamini, 1997, and van Doorslaer and Gerdtham, 2003). However,
Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) emphasise that the responses to such ques-
tions, which translate underlying clinical health into a subjective measure, are
subject to considerable heterogeneity: individuals may have different reference
points for this evaluation, which may also change over time. There are indeed
a number of reasons why individual preferences may affect subjective health
evaluations. Individuals may differ in their reaction to physiological symptoms
according to their social status, which then affects their decision to consult a
doctor (Boltanski, 1971, Murray et al., 2001). A given clinical health status will
be appreciated differently according to both the cultural and historical context,
and the phenomenon of habituation which plays on individual expectations with
respect to health (Johansson, 1991, Heyink, 1993, Wu, 2001).3 Last, the survey
itself may introduce systematic measurement biases.4 When the transformation
function T (.) is dependent of individual Qi variables we do not have ordinal
interpersonal comparability of reported health. This problem becomes crucial
for the measurement of income-related inequalities in clinical health when T (.)
depends on income. For instance, the strong positive correlation between in-
come and subjective health, could just as well reßect an optimism bias which
rises with income as a positive effect of income on the production of clinical
health. Then, the clinical health-income relationship is confounded by report-
ing heterogeneity, and the methods developed inter alia by Wagstaff and van
Doorslaer (1994) or Kakwani et al. (1997) are no longer valid.
A number of papers in Health Economics have already considered income-
related reporting heterogeneity in subjective health. Current results are mixed.
For instance, Humphries and van Doorslaer (2000), using Canadian data, re-
port some results, which indicate that there is a pessimism reporting bias for
lower income individuals. On the same data set, Lindeboom and van Doorslaer
(2004) Þnd reporting heterogeneity linked to income for young men with lower
education. Last, Hernandez-Quevedo et al. (2004), using British data, Þnd op-
timism bias amongst better-off respondents. Hence, the magnitude and the sign
of reporting bias seem to be country-speciÞc. In the perspective of international
comparisons, it is worth testing if there are also income-related reporting bias in
France. By concentrating on reporting heterogeneity linked to income, we un-
derline the inherent problems in relating health inequality to income inequality
when only subjective measures of health are available.
This article uses French data from the 2001 Conditions de Vie des ménages
survey to test reporting heterogeneity in subjective health. Our measure of Hi
is an individual judgement, whereby the respondent classiÞes her health using
ordered qualitative labels such as very good , good and so on: Hi is thus an
ordered qualitative variable with M levels. Using speciÞc identifying assump-
tion, we are able to test for reporting heterogeneity. However, we would also
like to assess the magnitude of reporting heterogeneity, which is quite difficult
3 Sadana et al. (2000) note that, in European Community Household Panel data from 1994,
53% of the Danish say they are in very good health, as compared to only 8% of the Portugese.
4Crossley and Kennedy (2002)
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in the absence of any exact measure of objective health. As such, the correlation
between income and subjective health is composed of the effect of income on
objective health, and the effect of income on judgement, i.e. the choice of a
qualitative verbal label that the individual uses to describe her objective state
of health. In the current paper, we follow Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995)
and Lindeboom and van Doorslaer (2004) by using a proxy measure of clinical
health to identify reporting heterogeneity. While the papers cited above use
pre-deÞned measures (the Hopkins Symptom Checklist and the Health utility
Index respectively), we construct a synthetic index based on a classiÞcation of
individuals resulting from a latent class analysis of a number of clinical health
conditions self-reported in our data. We then attempt to decompose the effect of
income on Hi into an effect on eHi and an effect on the transformation T [.;Q] ofeHi into Hi. This decomposition allows us to assess the magnitude of reporting
heterogeneity.
Our main Þnding is that there is substantial income-related reporting het-
erogeneity in subjective health in France. Our estimates also reveal that the
effect of a rise in income on subjective health varies according to the indi-
viduals initial income and initial subjective health level.5 Three results should
be emphasised. First, for individuals at the bottom of the income distribution
reporting a poor subjective health, income affects signiÞcantly subjective health
via clinical health. Furthermore, a fall in income has a strong negative report-
ing effect on the richest reporting a good or a very good health. Last, it is the
choice between the medium labels (fair vs. good) which seems to be the
most affected by reporting heterogeneity, whatever the income level. Hence,
the utilisation of subjective health information may bias the measure of health
inequality, except if one is willing to dichotomize appropriately the subjective
health measure, the bottom category (poor) being taken as a reference.
The paper is organised as follows. Section two explains the method. Section
three presents the data. The results are found in Section four, and are discussed
in Section Þve. Section six concludes.
2 Models and Methods
2.1 SpeciÞcation
We suppose that clinical health eHi is linked to the information set Xi by a linear
index equation :
eHi = α0 +Xiα+e²i (2)
5The rest of the paper uses the term effect somewhat abusively, since income is potentially
endogenous: health inßuences productivity, and unobservable factors such as time preference
may affect simultaneously investment in health and career choices. See Adams et al. (2003)
for a thorough treatment of this question.
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where α is a vector of parameters and e²i is an error term capturing inobservable
terms. To measure the effect of income on eHi, we have to identify α in equation
(2). The reporting equation linking the observable variables is:
Hi = T [α0 +Xiα+e²i;Qi] (3)
The function T (.; .) and the error term e² are thus nuisance parameters.
When there is common agreement regarding evaluation of subjective health,
i.e. when everyone agrees on what it means to be in very good/good/.../poor
health, the interpersonal comparability of health is assured. The relation (3)
reduces toHi = T [α0+Xiα+e²i]. We can then suppose that there exist cutpoints
s0, s1..., sM such that
s0 = −∞, sM =∞,
∀m = 1, ...,M, Hi = m ⇐⇒ sm−1 ≤ eHi ≤ sm
with the identiÞcation restriction α0 = 0: when e²i is distributed normally, this
relation deÞnes the ordered probit model.
We can relax the hypothesis of common agreement by supposing that the
cutpoints are idiosyncratic si0, si1..., siM such that
si0 = −∞, siM =∞, (4)
∀m = 1, ...,M − 1, sim = Qiβm
∀m = 1, ...,M, Hi =m ⇐⇒ sim−1 ≤ eHi ≤ sim
where βm are additional parameters, and Q includes a constant (Terza, 1985;
Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995; Groot, 2000; Lindeboom and van Doorslaer,
2003; Hernandez-Quevedio et al., 2004). The model deÞned by equations (2)
and (4) is a generalised ordered probit (Pudney and Shields, 2000). Reported
health Hi then depends on the way in which clinical health eHi is translated
by the cutpoints (si0, si1..., siM). This model, in which the cutpoints depend
on observable variables, is particularly well-suited to cross-section data. In
panel data, it is possible to estimate semi-parametric ordered logit models in
which the cutpoints are individual nuisance parameters (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and
Frijters, 2004).
2.2 Testing for reporting heterogeneity
The generalised ordered probit model poses substantial interpretation problems
when Qi and Xi overlap. In this case, a movement in income can affect both
reporting (i.e. the transformation of eHi into Hi) and clinical health eHi. The
speciÞcation we use renders the separation of these two effects impossible. To
illustrate the problem, note that the probability of observing reply m can be
written as:
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Pr(Hi = m) = F [Qiβm −Xiα]− F [Qiβm−1 −Xiα] (5)
where F (.) is the distribution function of the unobservable e²i. This probability
can also be written for any vector of parameters δ as:
Pr(Hi = m) = F [Qi(βm+δ)−(Xiα+Qiδ)]−F [Qi(βm−1+δ)−(Xiα+Qiδ)] (6)
or again for any couple of vectors α1 and α2 such that α = α1 + α2 as:
Pr(Hi = m) = F [(Qiβm −Xiα1)−Xiα2]− F [(Qiβm−1 −Xiα1)−Xiα2)] (7)
The structural models associated with these probabilities differ with respect
to the speciÞcation of the cutpoints sim and the modelisation of eHi. For the
models associated with equation (6) we have eHi = Xiα +Qiδ +e²i and sim =
Qi(βm + δ); for those associated with (7) we have eHi = Xiα2 +e²i and sim =
Qiβm−Xiα1. Hence equation (2) is only identiÞed if Qi and Xi are orthogonal
to each other. The results from the literature show that it is difficult to classify a
priori variables as belonging exclusively to Xi or Qi. The model does not yield
an a posteriori classiÞcation either. Any variable which has an effect on eHi
also potentially inßuences the cutpoints (see the equivalence between equations
(5) and (7)). Consequently the hypothesis of interpersonal comparability is not
testable. Analogously, any variable playing a role in the determination of the
cutpoints may equally affect eHi (see the equivalence between equations (5) and
(6)).
The generalised ordered probit model does however allow us to conclude
that a variable affects individual reporting if it has a heterogeneous effect on
the different cutpoints. A variable has a heterogeneous effect on the cutpoints if
the coefficients βm associated with this variable vary according to the cutpoint
m, which can be shown by a Hausman test of the equality of coefficients of the
cutpoints (Pudney and Shields, 2000). In the rest of this article, we shall call
this test Test 1.
Focusing on income-related reporting heterogeneity, Test 1 may reject ho-
mogeneity of income effects, and thus accept reporting heterogeneity, because
the link between income and eHi is badly speciÞed. Let Yi denote income and
Zi the other variables, and Xi = (Yi, Zi). Suppose for example that this rela-
tionship is actually concave (for example eHi = α1 log(Yi) + α2Zi +e²1i ). ln this
case, we will certainly Þnd a heterogeneous effect of income on the cutpoints,
corresponding, at least in part, to variations in the effect of income on clinical
health eHi in the region of the cutpoints (cf. Figure 1).
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Figure 1. SpeciÞcation error and estimation bias.
In Figure 1, the real model is shown by a continuous Þne line. The real re-
lation between income Yi and clinical health eHi is concave (the curve Γ0). The
cutpoints are represented by horizontal lines which are independent of income
(the horizontal lines s01 and s
0
2). The identiÞcation of the model depends cru-
cially on the information brought by individuals who are close to the intersection
of the cutpoints and the health production curve (points A and B). The curve
Γ1 corresponds to a model specifying a linear health production function. The
effect of income actually only works through the production of clinical health,
an effect which differs according to whether we are close to point A or to point
B. With a linear speciÞcation of health production, this effect can be decom-
posed into an effect on clinical health which is identical at points A and B, and
a different effect on each cutpoint, which effects will depend on income. Hence,
close to A, the real impact of income on clinical health is greater than the slope
of Γ1: there is therefore a compensation via a negative effect of income on the
cutpoint. As such, we will Þnd a heterogeneous effect of income on the cut-
points. We are thus fully aware that we identify reporting heterogeneity only
under the following assumption:
Hypothesis 1 The relationship between income and clinical health eHi is
correctly speciÞed.
To guard against a potential speciÞcation bias, we use a set of eight dummy
variables measuring household income: the relationship between income and
clinical health is thus speciÞed in a very ßexible manner.
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2.3 Assessing the existence of reporting heterogeneity
Using the generalised ordered probit model, we Þrst test for the presence of
income-related reporting heterogeneity. For this, as emphasized previously, we
rely on the assumption that the variables with a heterogeneous effect on the
cut-points affect the reporting of clinical health.
Suppose that (2) is a reduced form equation for health capital production:
Xi only includes prices and resources (Þnancial, educational, social) affecting
health investment. This is the approach taken by van Doorslaer and Jones
(2003) and Hernandez-Quevedo et al. (2004). It allows us to show that some
variables including income has a heterogeneous effect on the cutpoints. We
hence estimate speciÞcation (A), which satisÞes Hypothesis 1:
eHi = α1Yi + α2Zi +e²1i = αXi +e²1i
si0 = −∞, siM =∞, (8)
∀m = 1, ...,M − 1, sim = β1mYi + β2mZi = βmXi
∀m = 1, ...,M, Hi = m ⇐⇒ sim−1 ≤ eHi ≤ sim
All of the variables here potentially inßuence both the cutpoints and clinical
health. By supposing that e²i is distributed normally with variance σ1² , the
probability of observing reply m can be written:
Pr(Hi =m) = Φ
·
(βm − α)
σ1²
Xi
¸
−Φ
·
(βm−1 − α)
σ1²
Xi
¸
(9)
As the variance σ1² of the residuals is normalised to 1 for estimation, this speci-
Þcation allows us to identify γm =
(βm−α)
σ1²
∀m = 1, ...,M − 1 (including, for the
income, γ1m =
(β1m−α1)
σ1²
), and to carry out Test 1 of the equality of the cut-
points. SpeciÞcation (A) will thus help us to test for reporting heterogeneity, by
determining the variables that have an heterogeneous effect on the cutpoints.
However, it is impossible to identify the variables that have an homogeneous
effect on the cut-points.
Without additional hypotheses it is difficult to interpret the effect of a vari-
able for which the coefficients βm are not identical for each m: such a variable
has a non-linear effect on the cutpoints (a reporting effect) but could also have
a linear effect on clinical health. A number of different strategies can be imag-
ined to overcome these difficulties of interpretation. Groot (2000) supposes that
for all individuals si1 = 0: one of the two extreme subjective health categories
constitutes a common anchoring point. This hypothesis allows us to identify
separately α and a part of the βm. van Dooslaer and Jones (2003) appeal to
the correspondance, for any sub-group of the population, between the distribu-
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tion of subjective health and the distribution of a synthetic measure of clinical
health, the Health Utility Index.6
In the current paper, we are interested in both the identiÞcation of the
effect of variables including income on eHi as well as the income effect on the
cutpoints. To achieve this goal, we adopt a third strategy proposed by Kerkhofs
and Lindeboom (1995) and Lindeboom and van Doorslaer (2004): the use of a
proxy measure of clinical health.
2.4 Assessing the magnitude of reporting heterogeneity
Now imagine that (2) is a measurement equation. Including in Xi a synthetic
measure of clinical health that has by assumption no effect on the cut-points
will help us to isolate the income-related reporting heterogeneity. In this line,
Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) use the Hopkins Symptom Checklist and Lin-
deboom and van Doorslaer (2004) use the Health Utility Index. As we do not
have a ready-made measure available, we construct our own by a latent class
analysis of a number of self-reported clinical health conditions. One may argue
that, instead of using a synthetic measurement index constructed from a set
of clinical health measures,we could drop directly all these clinical measures in
equation (2). However, a number of Þndings suggest that some clinical health
conditions may have a speciÞc impact on the way the individuals perceive their
health (see, for instance, Wu, 2001). Using a synthetic proxie measure of clinical
health yields two beneÞts here. First, it keeps the model parsimonious. Second,
we can detect the clinical health conditions that have a heterogeneous effect on
the cut-points and, as such, are likely to affect reporting.
Let H0 be this synthetic measure of clinical health for which the following
conditional mean independence condition holds:7
Hypothesis 2
E( eH|H0, Y,Z) = E( eH|H0, Z)
SpeciÞcation (B) then consists of the following equations:
eHi = δ1H0 + δ2Zi +e²2i
si0 = −∞, siM =∞, (10)
∀m = 1, ...,M − 1, sim = β1mYi + β2mZi = βmXi
∀m = 1, ...,M, Hi = m ⇐⇒ sim−1 ≤ eHi ≤ sim
6They investigate the effect of age, sex and disabilities on reporting heterogeneity. To
achieve this objective, they deÞne appropriate sub-groups by crossing indicators for age, sex
and/or disabilities. If, for instance, 25% of individuals in a sub-group report a poor health,
then the 25th percentile of the empirical distribution function of the health utility index in
the subgroup is the threshold for the choice between the poor and the fair labels.
7Note that hypothesis 2 may be replaced by a more stringent assumption (see Kerkhofs
and Lindeboom, 1995): p.d.f.( eHi ¯¯H0, Yi, Zi ) = p.d.f.( eHi ¯¯H0, Zi )
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Here, we assume for the sake of parsimony that H0 picks up only the effect
of income on clinical health. This is why we keep the Zi variables in the health
production equation.
Letting β1m be the coefficient associated with the income variable for the
cutpoint (i.e. sim = Yiβ
1
m+Ziβ
2
m), this second speciÞcation allows us to identify
γ01m =
β1m
σ2²
. The variance σ2² of the residual e²2i being a priori different from one
speciÞcation to another, the direct comparison of the coefficients γ1m and γ
01
m
resulting from the estimation of (A) and (B) does not permit us to identify
the effect of income on eHi. Indeed, H0 contains certainly more information oneHi than does income, for, in this case, σ2² < σ1² . The hypothesis of equality
of variance being strong, we compare the marginal effects of income between
speciÞcations (A) and (B). Under Hypothesis 2, speciÞcation (B) identiÞes
the effect of reporting heterogeneity on income, and comparing marginal effects
between the two speciÞcations enables us to evaluate the impact of income on
the production of clinical health at different levels of income and subjective
health.
3 Data
We test for reporting heterogeneity in subjective health in France, by using data
from the Enquête Permanente sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages survey,
carried out by the INSEE in 2001. This survey contains informations at both
the household and the individual level. In particular, we have various household
indicators (housing and Þnancial situation amongst others) and the usual socio-
demographic informations on three household members drawn randomly in each
household. Last, one randomly-drawn individual in each household answers a
health questionnaire. The Þnal sample consists of 5194 individuals in the same
number of households.
It is difficult to construct clinical health indicators which are valid for both
younger and older adults, due to the natural depreciation of health with age,
as is suggested by the existence of speciÞc health measures for the elderly. This
is why respondents aged over 65 were dropped.We analyse the sub-sample of
respondents having Þnished their schooling and under 65 years of age at the
time of the interview, so as to use the variables referring to education and
household structure. Given the missing values, this leaves us with a sample of
2956 individuals.
This section presents descriptive statistics regarding the key variables, as
well as the method that we use to construct a synthetic indicator of clinical
health.
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3.1 Subjective Health and Income
Subjective health is measured by the question Would you say that your current
health status is very good, good, fair, poor, bad, very bad . The last three
ordered response categories have been grouped together due to small cell sizes.
The subjective health variable thus consists of four ordered categories: very
good, good, fair, poor.
In the estimation sample, 52% of respondents say that they are in good
health, and only 6% in poor health. Women are more likely to say that they are
in poor health than men: 7.1% vs. 4.5% respectively. There are two distinct
periods in the evolution of subjective health with age: up to the age of 40, health
is good, and the variance of self-reported health decreases with age; afterwards
there is a gradual degradation of self-reported health with age, with increasing
variance.
We tested variables such as social class, debt, and labour market status to
capture individuals economic and Þnancial status. Preliminary analyses reveal
that the variables which were the most strongly correlated with clinical and
subjective health were education and income.
Education is measured by four dummy variables for: no qualiÞcations, CEP
or Brevet des collèges (QUAL1 ); a short or long technical qualiÞcation (CAP,
BEP, Technical or Vocational Baccalauréat: QUAL2 ); a general Baccalauréat
(QUAL3 equivalent to a A-level); or higher education (QUAL4 ). Subjective
health is positively correlated with education. In particular, the least-educated
individuals are more likely to say that they are in poor health than the other
respondents (11.3 against 4 respectively).8 This correlation probably reveals an
age effect, with older respondents likely being on average less well-educated due
to the increasing access to secondary and higher education over the past thirty
years. However, older respondents are also richer. Multivariate analyses in the
following section allow us to distinguish between the two explanations.
Income is deÞned at the household level. It is a a yearly income, net
from social contributions, and not equivalized. It is measured by nine cate-
gorical variables: under 9,000 Euros/year (noted as INCOME1 ), from 9,000
to 12,000 (INCOME2 ), from 12,000 to 15,000 (INCOME3 ), from 15,000 to
18,000 (INCOME4 ), from 18,000 to 22,500 (INCOME5 ), from 22,500 to 27,000
(INCOME6 ), from 27,000 to 36,000 (INCOME7 ), from 36,000 to 45,000 (IN-
COME8 ), over 45,000 (INCOME9 ). A higher level of household income is
associated with a better level of subjective health (see Figure A2, Appendix A).
The correlation between income and subjective health may reßect two dif-
ferent kinds of effects. First, higher income is associated with a better clinical
health, via greater investment in health. Second, for a given clinical health
status, perceived health status may rise with income, perhaps because the indi-
vidual feels more secure. This paper proposes a test of the two explanations.
8The 2001 reform of health coverage, which afforded everyone the same health coverage
regardless of their income only came into effect at the time the survey was carried out, and is
unlikely to affect the socio-economic gradient.
11
3.2 Clinical Health Measures
The estimation of speciÞcation (B) requires a measure of clinical health. The
PCV 2001 survey includes a number of different questions regarding individual
physical and psychological health.
We know about the serious or chronic illnesses from which the individual
suffers. Subjective health is worse when the individual suffers, or has suffered,
from one of the more common serious illnesses: nervous illnesses, problems of
the digestive system, paralyses, cancers, cardio-vascular problems, or musculo-
skeletic troubles. Nervous illness and paralyses are the most strongly associated
with lower levels of subjective health.9 Other clinical health variables are used:
teeth and eyesight problems, being currently treated for an illness, having had
a fever of over 39◦c in the past year, four dummy variables for weight (thin,
normal, overweight, obese).As these measures are self-declared, we may worry
that they reßect income-related heterogeneity in individual access to health,
and therefore the information that individuals possess. Indeed, a number of
these variables are strongly correlated with income, which determines access
to healthcare. Replies to these questions could indicate both clinical health
problems and inequities in the access to health care.10 In France, everyone is
covered by Social Security with a reimbursement rate of 75%, and 92% of the
French population have additional health insurance. Finally, the most costly
diseases are treated in hospital, which reduces drastically the individual cost of
health. Only teeth and eyesight cares are poorly reimbursed by social security.
The use of psychological health variables (feelings of loneliness, self-reported
stress, psychiatric treatment) is also open to criticism. However, the mental
well-being is an important dimension of health, and several measures of clinical
health, such as the Health Utility Index, include psychological measures in their
construction, as well as other self-reported health conditions.11
Last, we use several indicators that link clinical health to every day living,
such as not being able to exercise, to work or to give blood, or having a limited
mobility.
We use these self-reported clinical health conditions to build a synthetic
index H0. Alternatively, we could introduce all self-reported clinical health
conditions in the vector Xi, in order not to loose information. But, Þrst, our
approach is more parsimonious in that we do not overload the model with too
many parameters. Second, we test whether each self-reported condition has a
speciÞc impact on the thresholds, which we interpret as an evidence of adapta-
tion or mis-adapatation to illness.
9Wu (2001) shows that ischemic illnesses affect not only clinical health, but also the percep-
tion that the individual has of her health. Those who have experienced heart attacks become
more optimistic about their health, ceteris paribus. We will test for this result in our data.
10Poorer respondents experience health problems younger and may not be well-diagnosed
by the health care system (Jougla et al. 2000).
11More generally, we propose here a partial equilibrium analysis that excludes feedbacks.
For instance, self-reported health conditions are diagnosed by the medical institutions only
if the individual visits a doctor. But visits to doctors are determined by income and the
subjective perceptions of ones own health.
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A number of different techniques can be used to sum up the information
contained in these clinical health measures. The best-known are factor analysis,
latent class analysis (LCA, see Bandeen-Roche et al., 1997) and the Grade of
Membership method (GoM, see Portrait et al., 1999). The LCA and GoM
approaches split the population up into classes, in such a way that the clinical
health indicators are independent conditionally to class membership (Goodman,
1974, McLachlan and Peel, 2000). The LCA method supposes that probabilities
of class membership are equal across individuals, contrary to the GoM approach.
However, the asymptotic properties of the GoM method are unknown (there
are more parameters than observations). Moreover, the only sure way of using
GoM techniques is to hypothesise that the probabilities of class membership
follow a certain distribution, which imposes parametric restrictions (Erasheva,
2002). This is one reason why we appeal to LCA analysis, which is presented
in Appendix B.
We choose to classify the sample into 6 latent classes, which can be consid-
ered as ordered with reference to the mean values of the clinical health variables
in each class. The Þrst two classes, which represent 40.7% and 15.2% of the
sample, are characterised by the absence of serious health problems. However,
individuals in the second group are all overweight. The large percentage Þgure
of those with no chronic disease is explained by the absence of individuals aged
over 65. The third class accounts for 13.7% of the sample, with members who
are not ill, but are more likely to spend time in hospital, see their doctor and
take medicines regularly, take more time off of work, and are more likely to
suffer psychologically (feeling alone or stressed). The fourth class covers 17.6%
of the population, and is similar to the third class, but more so. Restrictions
on giving blood and ischemic illnesses are more frequent. The third and fourth
classes consist of individuals with pathologies that are treated via preventative
actions. The last two classes include individuals who are most likely to re-
port the health problems we consider, with a slight difference between the two
groups. In the Þfth class (6.5% of the sample), the probability of psychological
problems is higher, while in the sixth class (6.3% of the sample), physical health
problems are more prevalent: difficulties in walking, not being able to take part
in sporting activities, a diminished ability to work, needing help (see Table A.2.
in Appendix A).
In the regressions, we introduce the estimated probabilities that the indi-
vidual belongs to each one of the six classes. The omitted category is the Þrst
class, that of individuals with no serious health problems.
3.3 Other control variables
It is possible that local cultural effects explain both differences in clinical health
and the degree of optimism that the individual expresses about her health.
The health Atlas in France shows sharp differences in mortality rates between
regions (Salem et al., 1999). We include as explanatory variables the region and
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classiÞcation of residential area: rural (STRATA1 ), urban with under 20 000
inhabitants (STRATA2 ), urban with between 20 000 and 100 000 inhabitants
(STRATA3 ), and urban with over 100 000 inhabitants (STRATA4 ). Paris is
considered separately as living in Paris induces very speciÞc living conditions in
comparison to the rest of Ile de France. For instance, while commuting times
are lower for Parisians, they face very speciÞc environmental conditions (more
pollution and more noise), housing is much more expensive, etc.. In addition,
we introduce controls for the individuals family situation.
4 Estimation results
In this section we present in turn the results of generalised ordered probit esti-
mation of speciÞcations (A) and (B). We then consider the robustness of our
results, and decompose the marginal effect of income into an effect on clinical
health and reporting heterogeneity.
Tables C1 and C2 in Appendix C show the estimation results. Table C1
presents the results for the variables which, in speciÞcation (A), have a homo-
geneous effect on the cutpoints, according to Test 1, which is applied to each
group of variables separately, i.e. we test regional dummies, then sex, then age
etc. Table C2 shows the results with respect to the variables which do have dif-
ferent effects on the different cutpoints. For each speciÞcation, the Þrst column
shows, for comparison purposes, the results from simple ordered probit estima-
tion with common cutpoints. The second column shows estimation results from
generalised ordered probit models. In Table C2, for each speciÞcation, columns
2 to 4 show the results for the three cutpoints with a sign reversal to ease the
interpretation in terms of health effects (i.e. coefficients −β1,−β2,−β3).
4.1 The socioeconomic determinants of health
SpeciÞcation (A), which does not include informations on clinical health, allows
us to measure the correlations between our socioeconomic variables and subjec-
tive health. Sex, age (measured as a three-order polynomial)12, education, and
type of residential area have the same effect on cutpoints. However, family
situation, region and income have a heterogeneous effect on the cutpoints.
The results of a simple ordered probit, which does not take into account re-
porting heterogeneity, are fairly standard (the Þrst column of Table C1): male
has a positive estimated coefficient on reported health, as does income or living
in the West of France. On the other hand, lower levels of education attract
negative coefficients. The results of the generalised ordered probit are more ju-
dicious (second column of Table C1). In particular, amongst the variables which
12We tested for a break in the age trend at age 40, as indicated by our descriptive analysis
of the age/self-assessed correlation. It turns out that, everything else being equal, there is
no signiÞcant break. Other econometric speciÞcations of the age effect were tested with no
signiÞcant improvement.
14
do not affect the cutpoints, only sex and being unqualiÞed are signiÞcant: males
are more likely to say that they are in good health. Having no education has
a negative effect and, as we are controlling for income, this result is consistent
with a basic assumption of the demand for health model: the efficiency of health
production rises with education (Grossman, 1972). However, age is insigniÞcant
at the ten per cent level. This may result from the exclusion of those aged over
65.
While the two variables best characterising household structure have no
signiÞcant effect on individual perceptions of health, this is not true for the
region dummies. The omitted category is living in Paris. Living in the Ile-de-
France (outside of Paris) is associated with a smaller cutpoint between poor and
fair health, showing a lesser tendency to declare oneself in poor health. Those
living in the West, as opposed to those living in the East or the North, are also
less likely to say that they are in poor or fair health.
There is a positive correlation between subjective health and income. Being
poor (income categories 1 to 3 out of 9) is negatively correlated with the declared
level of health, the estimated coefficients being signiÞcant for all of the cutpoints.
While poverty increases the probability of being in poor health, those in middle
or higher income classes are not signiÞcatively more or less likely to report a
poor health: income does not protect against poor health, it is rather poverty
that is a risk factor for poor health. There is also a signiÞcant difference between
the effect of being in the medium income categories (4 to 6) and the high income
classes (categories 7 to 9) on the probability of reporting a very good health. In
sum, the hypothesis of a homogeneous correlation of income with the cutpoints
is rejected in favour of heterogeneous correlations (Test 1, P-value=0.020 ).
Hence, under Hypothesis 1, there is income-related reporting heterogeneity in
subjective health.
4.2 Clinical and Subjective Health
SpeciÞcation (B) introduces the clinical health measure constructed in sub-
section (3.2), which allow us under Hypothesis 2 to identify income-related
reporting heterogeneity.
The results from speciÞcation (B) are presented on the right-hand side of
Tables C1 and C2 in Appendix C. Following Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995)
and Lindeboom and van Doorslaer (2004), we introduce our synthetic measures
of clinical health into the index only (equation (2)). As a number of articles
have evoked the phenomenon of habituation to health problems (or coping),
we also test the impact of clinical health conditions on the cutpoints, so as to
identify any potential heterogeneous effects. We only retain in speciÞcation (B)
the variables for which we have identiÞed such a heterogeneous effect on the
cutpoints.
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The coefficients on the different classes of clinical health exhibit the ex-
pected negative relationship, given the description of these classes above: the
relationship between clinical and subjective health is monotone positive. While
low education is associated with poorer health, sex no longer has an impact
on health. Living in the West of France or in Greater Paris is associated with
a probability of declaring oneself in poor or fair health, but no effect on the
probability of declaring oneself in very good health.
Five measures of health conditions have a heterogeneous effect on the cut-
points. Having stayed in hospital, regular examinations due to an illness or
being advised against certain sporting activities affect the probability of report-
ing a poor or fair health, but not the the probability of declaring oneself in very
good health. Having heart problems reduces the probability of declaring oneself
in poor health, without affecting the probability of declaring oneself in good or
very good health. This recalls the results in Wu (2001) regarding hedonic adap-
tion to cardio-vascular health problems. Last, feelings of stress have a negative
effect on subjective health, but more so on the probability of the respondent
saying that they are in fair or poor health.
In this speciÞcation, income always has a positive but heterogeneous effect
on the cutpoints (with a P−value of 0.023 for Test 1). This result is of interest
because it differs from that in Lindeboom and van Doorslaer (2004) on Cana-
dian data, who Þnd heterogenous effects for age and sex, but not for income.
The difference in results between countries might be interpreted as reßecting
heterogeneity in reporting between countries. The following section considers
in more detail the relationship between subjective health and income, paying
particular attention to the the distinction between reporting heterogeneity and
health production effects.
5 Health production vs. reporting
The only way to have an idea of the effect of income on health production is
to compare the marginal effects between the two speciÞcations. SpeciÞcation
(A) shows the total marginal effect of income on subjective health, while speci-
Þcation (B) indicates the marginal effect of income via reporting heterogeneity.
The difference between the two yields the effect of income on the production of
clinical health. On this basis, we describe how reporting heterogeneity affects
the predicted distributions of subjective health, and we provide some evidence
in favour of non-linearities in income effects by initial level of health.
5.1 Reporting heterogeneity
Using speciÞcation (B), we compare the distributions of predicted health level
for an individual with the average sample characteristics including the mean
sample clinical health. For each level of subjective health m, we compute the
following changes in the probability of reporting health greater than m :
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Pr(H > m|Y = j + 1,H0 = H0, Z = Z)− Pr(H > m|Y = j,H0 = H0, Z = Z)
Under Hypothesis 1, these variations represent the way reporting heterogene-
ity affects the distribution of subjective health for the average individual. Fig-
ures D.1. to D.3. in Appendix D report these probability changes for different
values of m and j.
If we consider the changes greater than 1% in absolute values, one clearly
note that reporting heterogeneity affects crucially the middle of the distribu-
tion of subjective health (fair and good). Reporting heterogeneity is also more
important at the extremes of the income distribution. Whereas there is almost
no income-related reporting heterogeneity for those reporting a poor health, we
observe a strong reporting bias for the more affluent in very good health. This
may be due to the speciÞcity of the subjective health distributions in the right
tail of the income distribution. As shown in Figure A.1., those in the 9th income
range (INCOME9=1) are less likely to report a good level of health and much
more likely to report a very good level of health than those in the 8th income
range (i.e. with INCOME8=1). This peculiarity of our data explains that the
gradient in the coefficients of the income dummies is fairly ßat when one moves
from INCOME2 to INCOME8 (between -0.567 and -0.369, see Table C.2. last
column), but the coefficient of INCOME8 is itself quite high (-0.429). Hence,
the marginal change of moving from INCOME8 to INCOME9 is very important
in the right tail of the health distribution.
In the end, our estimates provide clear evidence in favour of the existence
of income-related reporting heterogeneity. However, although a number of mar-
ginal effects are fairly large, our estimates are somewhat imprecise. ConÞdence
intervals for these changes were calculated using the delta-method, at the level
of 95% and 22 changes out of 24 are unsigniÞcant for SpeciÞcation (B), 19 out
of 24 for SpeciÞcation (A).
5.2 Decomposing the income effect
We now decompose the health-income total correlation in a health production
effect and a reporting bias. The individual marginal effect is calculated as the
impact of the transition from income category j to income category j+1 on the
probability of declaring health greater than m. For speciÞcation (A), it is:
∆
(A)
i = Pr(H > m|Y = j + 1, Z = Zi)− Pr(H > m|Y = j, Z = Zi)
and for speciÞcation (B), the individual effect is:
∆
(B)
i = Pr(H > m|Y = j+1,H0 = H0i , Z = Zi)−Pr(H > m|Y = j,H0 = H0i , Z = Zi)
These can be interpreted as the probability of leaving the health categories
inferior or equal to m as the individual changes from income category j to j+1.
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Figure 1: Summary of the results.
These marginal effects are calculated for each individual i and for speciÞcations
(A) and (B). For each j, we then average these individual effects over the sub-
sample of those who are in income range j.13 These mean effects are represented,
with the difference between them, in Figures D.4. to D.6. in Appendix D, which
correspond to the three health states in which the individual may initially Þnd
herself (m = 1,m = 2, andm = 3). The graphical representation of speciÞcation
(A), given by the dotted line, shows the total effect of income on health. The
effect due to reporting heterogeneity results from speciÞcation (B), and is shown
by the thick black line. The thin line, which is the difference between these two,
shows the effect of income on health production. For each individual, we are able
to compute conÞdence intervals for the total marginal effects and the reporting
heterogeneity effect.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from our estimates and are sum-
marized in Figure 2. First, the health production effect of a rise in income
seems particularly important for those in the lowest income range (under 12000
Euros), whatever the subjective health level m we consider. This is consistent
with standard results of the literature on the health production effect of income
among the poorest (Deaton, 2003). Second, computing mean marginal effects
instead of marginal changes for the mean individual does not change our con-
clusion regarding reporting heterogeneity: the latter plays a very important role
for transitions from a fair to a good health level, but a minor role for exits from
a poor health level or transitions to a very good health level (except for the
more affluent). This reporting heterogeneity is somewhat convex in income.
13The results are about the same when one averages the marginal effects over the whole
sample rather than over the sub-sample of individuals in the treated income category.
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Figures D7 and D8 report the percentage of individuals in each income cat-
egory for which the reporting heterogeneity and the total effect of income are
signiÞcant at the 5% level. It clearly shows that reporting heterogeneity is quite
important for those in fair or good health whatever the income level, but also
for those in poor health. The pattern is less easy to interpret for those in good
or very good health, and in the middle of the income distribution (especially
income categories 4 to 7).
6 Conclusion
This article has demonstrated the existence of substantial reporting heterogene-
ity in subjective health in France. Our estimates reveal that the reporting bais
is convex in income and can be interpreted as an optimism bias. However,
this result relies heavily on the assumption that all of the health production
effect of income is captured by the introduction of the self-reported clinical
health conditions available in the survey. The validity of this hypothesis may
be questionable, since we may not capture all relevant income-related dimen-
sions of clinical health. If there is a pro-rich bias in access to health cares as one
may suppose, then the health production effect of income is underestimated,
and the income-related reporting biases are over-estimated for the low-income
individuals. In some sense, our work provides an upper-bound evaluation of
income-related reporting heterogeneity for the poorest.
Saying it, this paper shows the existence of substantial income-reporting
heterogeneity in subjective health, which are correlated with initial levels of
both health and income. In particular, we Þnd that, for those in the middle
of the subjective health distribution, a rise in income seems to affect subjective
health mainly via reporting (a noticeable exception being the poors).We also
uncover some empirical evidence that, for the less well-off in poor health, a rise
in income has a real effect on clinical health, which we have called a health
production effect although this term might be excessive. Indeed, we are fully
aware that we identify correlation rather than causalities, given that subjective
health determines the demand for health which, in turn, has an effect on income
(see Adams et al., 2003).
It is worth noting that we did not Þnd any connection between sex, age
or education and reporting heterogeneity, while such connections have been
found for other countries in previous studies. However, this may be speciÞc to
the methodology we use, which enables us to identify reporting heterogeneity
only in the case of heterogeneous cut-points shifts. Further, this may also be
explained by the very speciÞc nature of our sample, which excludes the elderly.
Last, the starting point and the limits of our exercise are clear: we focus
on subjective health as a cheap measure of clinical health, which is the true
objective of public health policies. First, one would not base a major change in
health policies on subjective health alone. Second, an alternative view is that
subjective health should be the target because any change in the same physical
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function (functionings) has an idiosyncratic impact on the individuals capacity
for enjoying life (Sen, 2003). Our results just call for cautiousness in the use
of subjective health measures for assessing income-related health inequalities
in French data. Binary indicators constructed from self-reported health may
however be used, if the poor health category is taken as a reference.
The reporting heterogeneity that we have identiÞed for the well-off in good
health should be followed up in future work, in particular with respect to medical
care and prevention. It would be interesting to consider a joint model of health
demand and evaluation of subjective health, given that the information used by
the individual to evaluate her health depends on the consumption of medical
services.
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APPENDIX A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS. 
 
Table A1. Variable definitions and main statistics 
 
 Definition Mean Std-error 
Male =1 if male 43.1%  
Age Age 43.1 11.6 
STRATA1 Urban area = rural 24.8%  
STRATA2 Urban with less than 20,000 inh. 16.3%  
STRATA3 Urban, between 20,000 and 100,000 inh. 13.8%  
STRATA4 Urban more than 100,000 including Paris  45.1%  
Income1 Household income <9,000 Euros /yr (converted from 
French Francs to Euros) 
8.3%  
Income2 9,000-11,999 Euros/yr 8.3%  
Income3 12,000-15,000 Euros/yr 10.9%  
Income4 15,000-18,000 Euros/yr 10.2%  
Income5 18,000-22,500 Euros/yr 14.2%  
Income6 22,500-27,000 Euros/yr 14.2%  
Income7 27,000-36,000 Euros/yr 16.3%  
Income8 36,000-45,000 Euros/yr 9.1%  
Income9 >45,000 Euros/yr 8.5%  
Qual4 =1 if education over the Baccalaureat (A-level) 27.3%  
Qual3 =1 if Baccalaureat achieved 34.2%  
Qual2 =1 if has a degree under the Baccalaureat 12.3%  
Qual1 =1 if no education 26.2%  
Single parent =1 if is a single parent 8.1%  
Live alone =1 if lives alone and aged over 30. 19.5%  
 
 
Figure A1. Distribution of subjective health by household’s income category 
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Table A.2. Objective health conditions 
 
Class 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Immunity 
Has had a fever over 39°c in the past year 3% 3% 6% 3% 6% 16% 
Use of health care 
Follows a psychiatric treatment 1% 1% 8% 5% 69% 54% 
Has regular check-ups for a chronic disease 0% 0% 26% 79% 59% 96% 
Has to take medicines regularly 9% 17% 38% 93% 95% 100% 
Had had an hospital stay in the past year 7% 7% 22% 15% 23% 53% 
Has been assisted at home for medical reasons more than 
3 months in the last year 
0% 0% 11% 1% 4% 30% 
Chronic illnesses that have been diagnosed 
Nervous system 0% 0% 1% 2% 3% 5% 
Digestive system 1% 2% 11% 8% 20% 25% 
Strain injury 0% 0% 5% 2% 0% 18% 
Cancer 0% 0% 1% 4% 0% 11% 
Heart 1% 3% 2% 41% 23% 32% 
Joints 3% 5% 24% 21% 32% 47% 
Other illnesses 3% 3% 21% 43% 24% 45% 
Frequent migraines 2% 2% 10% 5% 14% 17% 
Psychological troubles 1% 1% 10% 1% 52% 46% 
Mental well-being 
Feels sometimes stressed (ref: no stress) 33% 36% 28% 32% 13% 18% 
Feels often stressed (ref: no stress) 23% 20% 37% 21% 35% 31% 
Feels very often stressed (ref: no stress) 10% 9% 22% 11% 52% 40% 
Feeling of loneliness 7% 7% 18% 8% 47% 39% 
Limitations to capabilities 
Medical restrictions for blood donations 5% 4% 14% 39% 32% 68% 
Medical restrictions for sport 0% 2% 11% 10% 3% 64% 
Medical conditions limit working capabilities 0% 1% 16% 10% 24% 74% 
Mobility limited 0% 0% 12% 1% 4% 36% 
Teeth pains moderate (ref: none) 26% 25% 32% 17% 32% 27% 
Teeth pains severe (ref: none) 5% 6% 12% 6% 9% 12% 
Eyesight problems 56% 67% 68% 85% 89% 89% 
Thin (BMI<18.5) 7% 0% 3% 2% 6% 4% 
Overweight (25<BMI<30) 0% 100% 19% 34% 38% 20% 
Obese (BMI>30) 9% 0% 5% 17% 7% 22% 
B Constructing a measure of clinical health.
Consider a set of J qualitative objective indicators of health. Each indicator
Wij can take Lj values wij in {1, 2, .., Lj}. We construct from each Wij a
set of Lj dummies wijl such that wijl = 1{wij = l}. We suppose that the
distribution of objective health in the population is a mixture of K single-
valued distributions, whereby we deÞne K latent classes. Each individual has
a probability gk of belonging to class k. We note λkjl = Pr(wijl = 1|i ∈
k) the conditional probability of having characteristic l for the variable Wij
conditionaly to membership of class k. Latent Class Analysis (LCA) assumes
that the health indicators are independent conditionally to class membership.
Therefore, the individual contribution to the likelihood is (asssuming an i.i.d.
sample):
LLCA =
KX
k=1
gk
JY
j=1
LjY
l=1
(λkjl)
wijl
u.c.∀j,
LjX
l=1
λkjl = 1X
k
gk = 1
∀k, j, l, λkjl ∈ [0, 1], gk ∈ [0, 1]
This clustering model is estimated by an Expected-Maximisation (E-M) algo-
rithm, as membership of class k is missing (Dempster et al., 1977). The basic
idea is to work iteratively on the best prediction of the likelihood. Suppose
that, at iteration r − 1, one has an initial value for the parameters Θr−1 =
{∀k, j, l, gr−1k , λ
r−1
kjl }, then in the E-step of the rth itération, one computes:
E(L|Wij , Θr−1) =
KX
k=1
E(gk|Wij , Θr−1)
JY
j=1
LjY
l=1
(λkjl)
wijl
where by Bayes law:
E(gk|Wij , Θr−1) = Pr(gk = 1|Wij , Θr−1)
=
Pr(Wj |Θr−1, gk = 1)Pr(gk = 1|Θr−1)
Pr(Wj |Θr−1)
=
gr−1k
QJ
j=1
QLj
l=1(
λ
r−1
kjl )
wijl
Lr−1
In the M-step, this expected likelihood is maximised. The E-M algorithm
is monotonically increasing and converge for any starting value to a local max-
imum. To detect the global maximum, we used several starting values and
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Number of classes BIC ICL-BIC
2 -27143 -27399
3 -26735 -27257
4 -26551 -27377
5 -26450 -27465
6 -26372 -27309
7 -26308 -27479
8 -26230 -27382
a simulated annealing procedure (Celeux et al., 1995). After convergence, we
get the best estimates of individual probabilities of membership conditionally
on available information on objective health conditions : E(gk|Wij , Θ∞). The
latent classes can be ranked in terms of objective health, by comparing the
within-class distributions of the health indicators Wij . We then use the set of
probabilities E(gk|Wij , Θ∞) as a more objective measure of health. The opti-
mal number of classes is determined by the comparison of several information
criteria (AIC, BIC) with a potential penalty for the quality of the clustering
(for instance the Integrated Laplace Criterion, see McLachlan et Peel, 2000).
The analysis was undertaken on the sub-sample we use for the estimation of the
generalised ordered probit models : 2956 individuals aged under 65.
The Table B1 reports a number of criteria to choose the optimal number
of classes. McLachlan et Peel (2000) show on the basis of Monte-Carlo exper-
iments that the ICL-BIC criterion is better suited to the detection of latent
structures that pure information criteria such as the BIC. So, we may opt for
3 classes. However,the quality of the clustering improves again when one goes
from 5 classes to 6 classes (the ICL-BIC strongly increases), and the informa-
tion criteria are better for 6 classes than for 4 classes. In the end, we decided to
keep a 6-classes structure. In the regressions, we introduce Þve probabilities of
membership E(gk|Wj , Θ∞) (one of the probability has to be omitted since they
sum up to one).
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APPENDIX C. RESULTS. 
 
Table C1. Variables that do not have a differential effect on the thresholds 
 
Subjective Health Specification A Specification B 
 Ordered Probit (α) Generalized 
Ordered Probit (α)
Ordered Probit (α) Generalized Ordered 
Probit (α) 
 
Observable variables independent of the thresholds 
Objective Health: 
class 1 
No No Reference Reference 
Objective Health: 
class 2 
No No -0.134** 
(0.068) 
-0.146** 
(0.069) 
Objective Health: 
class 3 
No No -1.375*** 
(0.134) 
-0.887*** 
(0.104) 
Objective Health: 
class 4 
No No -0.831*** 
(0.102) 
-0.941*** 
(0.128) 
Objective Health: 
class 5 
No No -0.889*** 
(0.124) 
-1.337*** 
(0.138) 
Objective Health: 
class 6 
No No -2.124*** 
(0.179) 
-2.100*** 
(0.187) 
Male 0.154*** 
(0.042) 
0.149*** 
(0.042) 
0.027 
(0.045) 
0.029 
(0.045) 
STRATA1 0.051 
(0.057) 
0.054 
(0.057) 
-0.049 
(0.059) 
-0.043 
(0.060) 
STRATA2 -0.060 
(0.063) 
-0.060 
(0.063) 
-0.066 
(0.065) 
-0.072 
(0.066) 
STRATA3 -0.005 
(0.066) 
-0.008 
(0.066) 
0.013 
(0.068) 
0.017 
(0.069) 
STRATA4 
 
Reference Reference Reference Reference 
QUAL1 -0.209*** 
(0.065) 
-0.214*** 
(0.066) 
-0.161** 
(0.068) 
-0.166** 
(0.069) 
QUAL2 -0.059 
(0.058) 
-0.065 
(0.058) 
-0.001 
(0.060) 
-0.003 
(0.060) 
QUAL3 0.055 
(0.073) 
0.052 
(0.073) 
0.111 
(0.075) 
0.114 
(0.076) 
QUAL4 
 
Reference Reference Reference Reference 
AGE/10 -1.117 
(0.720) 
-0.932 
(0.724) 
-1.939** 
(0.749) 
-1.732** 
(0.756) 
(AGE/10)2 0.160 
(0.173) 
0.117 
(0.173) 
0.383** 
(0.179) 
0.335* 
(0.181) 
(AGE/10)3 -0.009 
(0.013) 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
-0.026* 
(0.014) 
-0.023 
(0.014) 
Threshold intercepts. ordered probit model only 
Threshold 1: s1 -4.700*** 
(0.969) 
No -6.727*** 
(1.010) 
No 
Threshold 2: s2 -3.622*** 
(0.968) 
No -5.230*** 
(1.008) 
No 
Threshold 3: s3 -2.034** 
(0.967) 
No -3.355*** 
(1.006) 
No 
Notes: Std. Error in parentheses. *** significant at the 1% level. ** significant at the 5% level. * significant at 
the 10% level. 
 
  
Table C2. Variables that have a differential effect on the thresholds  
 
Subjective 
Health 
Specification A Specification B 
 Ordered Probit Generalized Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Generalized Ordered Probit 
Thresholds None (linear 
index: α) 
Poor / 
Fair:-β1 
Fair / 
Good : -β2
Good / 
Very good 
: -β3 
None (linear 
index: α) 
Poor / Fair 
: -β1 
Fair / Good 
: -β2 
Good / 
Very good: 
-β3 
Paris Reference Reference Reference Reference 
Ile-de-France 0.067 
(0.076) 
0.318** 
(0.148) 
0.007 
(0.096) 
0.060 
(0.096) 
0.129 
(0.079) 
0.383** 
(0.180) 
0.113 
(0.107) 
0.105 
(0.100) 
West 0.135* 
(0.080) 
0.473***
(0.167) 
0.154 
(0.103) 
0.027 
(0.103) 
0.213** 
(0.083) 
0.633*** 
(0.206) 
0.294** 
(0.117) 
0.059 
(0.107) 
East -0.056 
(0.084) 
0.194 
(0.166) 
-0.198* 
(0.105) 
0.017 
(0.107) 
-0.005 
(0.087) 
0.303 
(0.207) 
-0.150 
(0.117) 
0.065 
(0.111) 
North -0.104 
(0.091) 
0.096 
(0.170) 
-0.201* 
(0.115) 
-0.061 
(0.125) 
-0.002 
(0.095) 
0.323 
(0.214) 
-0.072 
(0.131) 
-0.016 
(0.131) 
Center -0.023 
(0.079) 
-0.092 
(0.142) 
-0.027 
(0.102) 
0.007 
(0.103) 
0.099 
(0.082) 
0.032 
(0.178) 
0.151 
(0.115) 
0.085 
(0.108) 
Southwest -0.028 
(0.082) 
0.194 
(0.153) 
-0.086 
(0.103) 
-0.054 
(0.108) 
0.030 
(0.085) 
0.214 
(0.184) 
0.002 
(0.114) 
-0.004 
(0.112) 
Mediterranean 0.052 
(0.080) 
0.107 
(0.146) 
-0.016 
(0.101) 
0.111 
(0.105) 
0.034 
(0.083) 
0.235 
(0.188) 
-0.015 
(0.115) 
0.051 
(0.110) 
INCOME1 -1.115*** 
(0.116) 
-1.098***
(0.206) 
-1.145***
(0.144) 
-0.909***
(0.156) 
-0.898*** 
(0.121) 
-0.815*** 
(0.261) 
-0.964***
(0.162) 
-0.723***
(0.164) 
INCOME2 -0.810*** 
(0.113) 
-0.880***
(0.205) 
-0.828***
(0.141) 
-0.650***
(0.145) 
-0.730*** 
(0.118) 
-0.723*** 
(0.262) 
-0.796***
(0.158) 
-0.567***
(0.153) 
INCOME3 -0.558*** 
(0.104) 
-0.431** 
(0.205) 
-0.612***
(0.133) 
-0.497***
(0.128) 
-0.549*** 
(0.108) 
-0.231 
(0.262) 
-0.634***
(0.150) 
-0.510***
(0.134) 
INCOME4 -0.481*** 
(0.103) 
-0.287 
(0.213) 
-0.497***
(0.134) 
-0.490***
(0.128) 
-0.456*** 
(0.107) 
-0.050 
(0.271) 
-0.489***
(0.151) 
-0.472***
(0.134) 
INCOME5 -0.387*** 
(0.095) 
-0.079 
(0.212) 
-0.431***
(0.126) 
-0.400***
(0.115) 
-0.396*** 
(0.099) 
0.033 
(0.272) 
-0.461***
(0.140) 
-0.402***
(0.121) 
INCOME6 -0.302*** 
(0.093) 
-0.139 
(0.203) 
-0.289** 
(0.124) 
-0.333***
(0.113) 
-0.331*** 
(0.097) 
-0.002 
(0.259) 
-0.319** 
(0.139) 
-0.369***
(0.118) 
INCOME7 -0.239*** 
(0.090) 
0.013 
(0.206) 
-0.131 
(0.123) 
-0.357***
(0.109) 
-0.316*** 
(0.093) 
-0.087 
(0.256) 
-0.212 
(0.138) 
-0.411***
(0.113) 
INCOME8 -0.235** 
(0.099) 
-0.137 
(0.217) 
-0.080 
(0.136) 
-0.374***
(0.123) 
-0.301*** 
(0.102) 
-0.230 
(0.268) 
-0.095 
(0.152) 
-0.429***
(0.128) 
INCOME9 Reference Reference Reference Reference 
Live alone and 
aged over 30 
0.032 
(0.060) 
0.092 
(0.105) 
0.051 
(0.072) 
0.124 
(0.080) 
0.068 
(0.063) 
0.111 
(0.131) 
0.004 
(0.082) 
0.146* 
(0.085) 
Single parent -0.032 (0.081) 
0.169 
(0.160) 
0.062 
(0.099) 
-0.078 
(0.112) 
-0.031 
(0.085) 
0.184 
(0.194) 
-0.056 
(0.112) 
-0.095 
(0.118) 
Hospital stay No No -0.135** (0.066) 
-0.274** 
(0.114) 
-0.167** 
(0.085) 
0.019 
(0.097) 
Sport trouble No No -0.307*** (0.101) 
-0.323** 
(0.139) 
-0.407***
(0.125) 
0.077 
(0.176) 
Chronic 
diseases 
No No -0.186** 
(0.090) 
-0.188 
(0.130) 
-0.257***
(0.098) 
0.052 
(0.121) 
Ischemic 
diseases 
No No 0.161** 
(0.080) 
0.407*** 
(0.132) 
0.040 
(0.097) 
0.151 
(0.131) 
Subjective 
stress 
No No -0.180*** 
(0.023) 
0.229*** 
(0.050) 
0.236*** 
(0.031) 
-0.121***
(0.030) 
Intercept  4.160***(0.982) 
3.431***
(0.974) 
1.789** 
(0.973) 
 6.102*** 
(1.037) 
5.148*** 
(1.020) 
3.006*** 
(1.017) 
Notes: Std. Error in parentheses. *** significant at the 1% level. ** significant at the 5% level. * significant at 
the 10% level. 
  
APPENDIX D. MARGINAL EFFECTS. 
 
Figure D1. Probability of reporting SAH greater than poor. 
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Figure D2. Probability of reporting SAH greater than fair. 
Marginal effect at the mean Pr(H>2)
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Figure D3. Probability of reporting SAH greater than good. 
Marginal effect at the mean Pr(H>3)
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Table D1. Total effect (in points of probability) – specification (A) 
Initial income ∆Pr(H>1) ∆Pr(H>2) ∆Pr(H>3) 
Less than 9 000 €/year:  INCOME1 4.9% 12.5% 4.7% 
Between 9 000 and 12 000€: INCOME2 6.7% 8.0% 3.5% 
Between 12 000 and 15 000€: INCOME3 1.4% 4.0% 0.2% 
Between 15 000 and 18 000€: INCOME4 1.4% 2.2% 2.4% 
Between 18 000 and 22 500€: INCOME5 -0.4% 4.3% 1.9% 
Between 22 500 and 27 000€: INCOME6 0.8% 4.3% -0.7% 
Between 27 000 and 36 000€: INCOME7 -0.8% 1.3% -0.5% 
Between 36 000 and 45 000€: INCOME8 0.8% 1.8% 11.9% 
Ref: over 45 000 €. INCOME9 
Note: Marginal effects computed at the sample mean for all characteristics (including objective health in Table 
D2). These effects represent variations of probability of declaring an health status over the figure indicated in the 
top of the column. Variations are in percentage points. They are generated by an income increase such that the 
individual changes from income  category k to income category k+1 where the initial income category k is 
reported on the left.Effects in bold are significant at the 5% level, in bold and italic at the 10% level. 
 
Table D2. Reporting bias effect (in points of probability) – specification (B) 
Initial income ∆Pr(H>1) ∆Pr(H>2) ∆Pr(H>3) 
Less than 9 000 €/year:  INCOME1 0.9% 6.4% 2.9% 
Between 9 000 and 12 000€: INCOME2 2.8% 5.7% 1.2% 
Between 12 000 and 15 000€: INCOME3 0.5% 4.7% 0.8% 
Between 15 000 and 18 000€: INCOME4 0.2% 0.8% 1.6% 
Between 18 000 and 22 500€: INCOME5 -0.1% 4.1% 0.8% 
Between 22 500 and 27 000€: INCOME6 -0.2% 2.7% -1.0% 
Between 27 000 and 36 000€: INCOME7 -0.4% 2.7% -0.4% 
Between 36 000 and 45 000€: INCOME8 0.6% 1.9% 12.2% 
Ref: over 45 000 €. INCOME9 
 
Table D3. Health production effect (in points of probability) – (A)-(B) 
Initial income ∆Pr(H>1) ∆Pr(H>2) ∆Pr(H>3) 
Less than 9 000 €/year:  INCOME1 4.1% 6.2% 1.9% 
Between 9 000 and 12 000€: INCOME2 4.0% 2.4% 2.3% 
Between 12 000 and 15 000€: INCOME3 0.9% -0.7% -0.7% 
Between 15 000 and 18 000€: INCOME4 1.3% 1.3% 0.7% 
Between 18 000 and 22 500€: INCOME5 -0.3% 0.3% 1.1% 
Between 22 500 and 27 000€: INCOME6 1.0% 1.6% 0.3% 
Between 27 000 and 36 000€: INCOME7 -0.4% -1.4% -0.1% 
Between 36 000 and 45 000€: INCOME8 0.2% -0.1% -0.3% 
Ref: over 45 000 €. INCOME9 
Note: Figures in this table are computed by withdrawing those of table D2 from those of table D1  
 
  
Figure D4. Probability of reporting SAH greater than poor. 
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Note: Figures D4 to D6 represent average individual marginal effects of income on the probability of reporting 
health greater than 1, 2 or 3. The individual effects are averaged over individuals who are actually in the specific 
income categories. The "reporting heterogeneity" line is computed using estimates of specification (B), and the 
"total effect" line using estimates of specification (A). The "health production" line is simply the average of 
differences between marginal effects from (A) and from (B). 
 
Figure D5. Probability of reporting SAH greater than fair. 
Marginal effect at the mean Pr(H>2)
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Figure D6. Probability of reporting SAH greater than good. 
Marginal effect at the mean Pr(H>3)
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Figure D7. Specification A – Significance of the individual marginal income effect. 
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Note: Figures D7 and D8 represent for each income category the % of individuals for whom a given marginal 
effect is significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
Figure D8. Specification B – Significance of the individual marginal income effect. 
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